Justice DURHAM, opinion of the Court:
¶ 1 Appellants brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of a law, claiming that the law violated the state constitution in four respects. The district court dismissed the first two claims and rejected the second two claims on summary judgment. On appeal, we consider whether Appellants had standing to bring these claims in the first place. We hold that, although they lacked the personal injury required for traditional standing, Appellants had public-interest standing to bring the first two claims. We also hold that they did not have standing to bring the second two claims under either the traditional or the public-interest doctrine of standing, and we accordingly vacate the grant of summary judgment on those claims and remand to the district court for dismissal. Finally, we hold that although Appellants had standing to bring the first two claims, the district court properly dismissed the claims under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b)(6).
¶ 2 In March 2008, the legislature enacted Senate Bill 2 (the Bill). The Bill contained some fourteen items relating to education, establishing new programs and amending existing programs; it also contained funding provisions for some programs.
¶ 3 Appellants are a group of current and former legislators, other elected and unelected government officials, and self-described "good citizens." They include current and former members of the Utah State Board of Education (the Board). However, they appear in their individual capacities, and the Board itself is not a party to this litigation. In May 2008, Appellants filed suit in district court against the State's Attorney General, its Treasurer, and the Executive Director of the Department of Human Resources (collectively, Appellees), seeking a declaration that the Bill was unconstitutional and an injunction against its implementation, as well as an award of costs and fees.
¶ 4 Appellants claimed the Bill was unconstitutional in four respects. The first two claims fall under Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that "no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." (Emphasis added.) Appellants argue that the Bill as a whole violates this provision in two respects: first, they argue that it contained "more than one subject"; second, that its subject was not "clearly expressed in its title" (collectively, the Article VI Claims). The second two claims fall under Article X, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that "[t]he general control and supervision of the public education system shall be vested in a State Board of Education." Appellants argue that two items of the Bill violate this provision: first, the item that delegates the administration of the Teacher Salary Supplement Program to the Department of Human Resources; second, the item that delegates textbook approval to private entities (collectively, the Article X Claims).
¶ 5 Appellees moved to dismiss the Article VI Claims pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. They subsequently moved to dismiss the Article X Claims for lack of standing and moved in the alternative for partial summary judgment on those claims. The district court granted Appellees' motion to dismiss the Article VI Claims for failure to state a claim, and later granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the Article X Claims. It did not rule on the alternative motion to dismiss those claims for lack of standing.
¶ 7 We have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).
¶ 8 "We review the grant of a motion to dismiss for correctness, granting no deference to the decision of the district court." State v. Apotex Corp., 2012 UT 36, ¶ 16, 282 P.3d 66 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, "[o]n appeal from a motion to dismiss, we review the facts only as they are alleged in the complaint. We accept the factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. ¶ 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 9 Since standing is a jurisdictional requirement, we first must determine whether Appellants have standing to bring any of their claims. Unlike in the federal system, our law recognizes that appropriate plaintiffs without individualized injury may nevertheless possess standing to bring certain claims treating issues of great public importance. We determine that the issues underlying the Article VI Claims rise to this level and that Appellants are appropriate parties to bring these claims; Appellants therefore have standing to raise the Article VI Claims. The issues underlying the Article X claims, however, do not rise to this level, and furthermore Appellants are not appropriately situated to bring them. Accordingly, they do not have standing to raise the Article X claims.
¶ 10 On the merits of the district court's dismissal of the Article VI Claims, we hold that even on the facts alleged by Appellants, the Bill does not violate either the single-subject or clear-title rules of Article VI, Section 22. Accordingly, the dismissal is affirmed.
¶ 11 "[I]n Utah, as in the federal system, standing is a jurisdictional requirement." Brown v. Div. of Water Rights of the Dep't of Natural Res., 2010 UT 14, ¶ 12, 228 P.3d 747.
¶ 12 "Unlike the federal system, the judicial power of the state of Utah is not constitutionally restricted by the language of Article III of the United States Constitution requiring `cases' and `controversies,' since no similar requirement exists in the Utah Constitution." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983).
¶ 13 "[D]espite our recognition of this Court's power to grant standing where matters of great public interest and societal impact are concerned," however, "this Court will not readily relieve a plaintiff of the salutory requirement of showing a real and personal interest in the dispute." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1150 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore,
¶ 14 In a more recent case, we summarized this alternative basis for standing as follows: "[T]he statutory and the traditional common law tests are not the only avenues to gain standing; Utah law also allows parties to gain standing if they can show that they are an appropriate party raising issues of significant public importance...." Cedar Mountain Envtl., Inc. v. Tooele Cnty. ex rel. Tooele Cnty. Comm'n, 2009 UT 48, ¶ 8, 214 P.3d 95 (emphasis added).
¶ 15 In Jenkins v. Swan we framed the middle step of the "three-step inquiry" as "the question of whether there is anyone who has a greater interest in the outcome of the case than the plaintiff." 675 P.2d at 1150. In Cedar Mountain, however, we modified the inquiry, requiring a determination of whether the plaintiff is "an appropriate party." 2009 UT 48, ¶ 8, 214 P.3d 95 (emphasis added). This shift in analysis is explained in intervening precedent. In 2006 we explained:
Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ¶¶ 36, 39, 148 P.3d 960 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 16 Our public-interest standing doctrine is not unusual in state jurisprudence. Numerous other states, mindful that their constitutions do not impose the same restrictions on their judicial power that the federal constitution imposes on federal courts,
¶ 17 The case of Michigan is particularly illuminating. Recently, the Supreme Court of that state overruled a line of cases which "departed dramatically from Michigan's historical approach to standing." Lansing Schs. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 487 Mich. 349, 792 N.W.2d 686, 689 (2010); see generally Kenneth Charette, Standing Alone?: The Michigan Supreme Court, the Lansing Decision, and the Liberalization of the Standing Doctrine, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 199 (2011). In restoring Michigan's traditional approach to standing, the Lansing court explained that "[t]here is no support in either the text of the Michigan Constitution or in Michigan jurisprudence ... for recognizing standing as a constitutional requirement or for adopting the federal standing doctrine." 792 N.W.2d at 693. The same is true of Utah's constitution and jurisprudence.
¶ 18 We reaffirm today the teaching of our precedent that "Utah law ... allows parties to gain standing if they can show that they are an appropriate party raising issues of significant importance." Cedar Mountain, 2009 UT 48, ¶ 8, 214 P.3d 95.
¶ 19 As explained above, Appellees below moved to dismiss the Article X Claims for lack of standing. The district court, however, granted Appellees' alternative motion for summary judgment on those claims without ever ruling on the question of standing. Appellees had earlier moved to dismiss the Article VI Claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although that rule may be used to dismiss a claim for lack of standing, see Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 577 (Utah Ct.App.1996), Appellees invoked it only to assert that Appellants had failed to state a cause of action. The district court therefore never considered
¶ 20 As mentioned above, however, this court may raise standing "sua sponte at any time." Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1207. We did so at oral argument, and then requested supplemental briefing on standing with respect to the Article X Claims. The arguments submitted by the parties in their supplemental briefs, however, are applicable to all four claims. For the following reasons, we determine that Appellants do not have traditional standing to raise any of their claims.
¶ 21 Appellants argue that they have traditional standing to bring the Article X Claims for two reasons. First, they argue that the challenged provisions of the Bill deny "plaintiffs as voters ... their political prerogative, implicit in Article 10, Section 3, to hold Board members politically accountable by a meaningful exercise of the right to vote." This argument is not persuasive. To the extent that one's status as a voter in itself ever gives one a right to challenge legislation, it can only be through some form of an alternative form of standing, such as our public-interest doctrine. It does not constitute a "personal stake in [a] controversy." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1150.
¶ 22 Appellants' second argument is that they have traditional standing to bring the Article X Claims because six of them are members of the Board.
¶ 23 For similar reasons, we determine that Appellants lack standing to bring those claims under the traditional doctrine of standing. As explained below, we conclude that they do have public-interest standing to bring the Article VI Claims. But that is only because we determine that violations of the provisions at issue in those claims are of sufficient public importance that they give Appellants standing to raise such violations in their role as citizens.
¶ 24 In previous cases where this court has reviewed the merits of a claim that either or both the single-subject and clear-title rules of Article VI, Section 22 have been violated, the plaintiffs alleged a direct and personal injury sufficient to satisfy the traditional standing test. See, e.g., State v. Barlow, 107 Utah. 292, 153 P.2d 647, 655 (1944) (persons convicted under a law criminalizing polygamous lifestyle alleging "that the statute actually contains four subjects"); Pass v. Kanell, 98 Utah. 511, 100 P.2d 972, 973, 975 (1940) (renter and owner of car found liable for tort challenging statutory basis for liability as violating both the single-subject and the clear-title rules); State v. Edwards, 34 Utah. 13, 95 P. 367, 368 (1908) (court reporter alleging that a law which "affect[ed] his salary" violated the single-subject rule). While we determine below that the Article VI Claims treat issues of public significance and that Appellants are appropriately situated to
¶ 25 As explained above, Appellants do not meet the traditional requirements for standing on any of their four claims. We therefore consider whether they meet the requirements for public-interest standing. First, we examine their Article VI Claims, and determine that they do meet those requirements.
¶ 26 Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides: "Except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification and general revision of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." These provisions, we have observed, "reflect[] an intent to limit legislative power and prevent special interest abuse" and are "clearly motivated by a wariness of unlimited legislative power." Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 34, 57 P.3d 1007.
¶ 27 The restrictions placed on legislative activity by Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution are part of the fundamental structure of legislative power articulated in our constitution. They are accordingly of sufficient importance and general interest that claims of their violation may be brought even by plaintiffs who lack standing under the traditional criteria.
¶ 28 Under Cedar Mountain, the importance of the issue by itself is not enough to give parties public-interest standing. One must also be "an appropriate party." Id.; see also id. ¶ 15 (emphasizing that "this test breaks down to two elements"). "[A]n appropriate party.... has the interest necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions...." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 36, 148 P.3d 960 (internal quotation marks omitted). To demonstrate that it is an "appropriate party," a plaintiff must further show that "the issues are unlikely to be raised if the party is denied standing." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 29 First, Appellants are "appropriate parties" with "the interest necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions" with respect to the Article VI Claims. The "appropriateness" of a party under the public-interest standing doctrine is a question of competency. In the Sierra Club case, we determined that the Club "would have standing under the alternative [public-interest] test" due to its policy concerns and status as an "entity focused on protecting the environment."
¶ 30 Second, Sierra Club requires that "the issues [be] unlikely to be raised if the party is denied standing." Id. ¶ 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). We can certainly construct hypothetical plaintiffs who might be seen to have traditional standing to bring at least some of Appellant's claims. For instance, a teacher whose colleagues' salaries were raised under the Teacher Salary Supplement Program, but whose own salary was left unchanged, might invoke direct economic interests. Similarly, we can imagine a suit brought by a textbook publisher whose materials were rejected pursuant to the Textbook Approval Program. But our inquiry is not whether some hypothetical plaintiff can be imagined; it is whether "the issues are unlikely to be raised if the party is denied [public-interest] standing." Id. (emphasis
¶ 31 One more feature of our prior statements on public-interest standing deserves mention. In Sierra Club, we observed that a court's recognition that a party has public-interest standing analysis
Id. ¶ 39 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). But Article VI, Section 22 places restrictions on the legislative process itself. Where the legislature has passed a bill and the governor has signed it, we cannot assume that either of those branches are appropriate parties to whom to entrust the prosecution of a claim that the bill violates the strictures of Article I, Section 22. And "more generalized" in this context speaks not to the general nature of the interest — for that is inherent in every issue of "sufficient weight" to justify the recognition of public-interest standing — but rather to the generalized nature of the issue itself.
¶ 32 We conclude that Appellants satisfy the requirements of the public-interest standing doctrine with respect to the Article VI Claims.
¶ 33 Article X, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution provides: "The general control and supervision of the public education system shall be vested in a State Board of Education." Appellants claim that the Bill violates this provision in two respects. First, they object to the Teacher Salary Supplement Program, which delegates to the Utah Department of Human Resources Management the duty of administering a pilot program to provide salary enhancements to certain science teachers in Utah public schools in order to dissuade them from seeking private employment. Appellants claim this is an unconstitutional delegation of an element of the "general control and supervision of the public education system" to an executive agency other than the one with that constitutionally specified role. Second, they argue
¶ 34 As explained above, Appellants do not have standing to bring the Article X Claims under "the traditional criteria of [having a] personal stake in the controversy." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1150. For the following reasons, we determine that they also lack standing under the alternative public-interest standing doctrine. As articulated in Cedar Mountain, that doctrine provides that "parties [may] gain standing if they can show that they are an appropriate party raising issues of significant public importance." 2009 UT 48, ¶ 8, 214 P.3d 95. "[A]n appropriate party.... has the interest necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions...." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 36, 148 P.3d 960 (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 35 Appellants fail to satisfy either element of the public-interest standing test with respect to their Article X Claims. First, while we have explained above that Appellants are "appropriate part[ies]" to raise the Article VI Claims, they are not as well situated to raise the Article X Claims. While the restrictions on the legislative process imposed by Article I, Section 22 give every citizen of Utah an interest in seeing them obeyed, the delegation in Article X, Section 3 of "general control and supervision of the public education system" to the Board does not create such a general interest. Further, Appellants below and in their briefs and argument on appeal have not proved themselves able to "assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions." Id. ¶ 36 The crucial question of how we are to understand the scope of "general control and supervision of the public education system," and the related question of what the historical practice and traditional core functions of the Board have been, were never sufficiently framed and answered. This played a role in the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the Article X Claims.
¶ 36 In addition to demonstrating that they are "appropriate part[ies]," plaintiffs must also raise issues of "sufficient public importance" to have standing under the public-interest doctrine. Id. ¶ 40 Every constitutional provision is surely important, but not every alleged violation of a constitutional provision will provide a basis for public-interest standing. As discussed above, the single-subject and clear-title rules imposed on the legislature by Article VI, Section 22 meet that standard. They are restrictions which must be observed every time the legislature exercises its core function of passing laws. The provision at issue in the Article X Claims, in contrast, is a delegation of a defined subject to a particular agency. While we do not conclude that such questions can never be appropriate ones in which to employ the public-interest standing doctrine, in combination with the Appellants' lack of "appropriateness" to treat them, their more localized significance renders the public-interest standing doctrine inapplicable to these plaintiffs on these claims.
¶ 37 Appellants further argue that their claims are unlikely to be brought by anyone else. As explained above, that is a necessary part of the showing parties must make under the public-interest standing doctrine. Id. ¶ 36. However, by itself it is not sufficient — and we have already determined that Appellants do not meet the other criteria for public-interest standing. Accordingly, we vacate the entry of summary judgment against Appellants on the Article X Claims and remand to the district court. The district court is directed on remand to dismiss these claims for lack of standing.
¶ 38 Having determined that Appellants, although they lack standing under "the traditional criteria of [having a] personal stake in the controversy," Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983), do have standing to bring the Article VI Claims under the alternative standard, we review the district court's grant of summary judgment on those claims. Again, Appellants claim that the Bill contains "more than one subject," and that
¶ 39 Again, Article VI, Section 22 provides that "no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." Appellants argue that the Bill treats too many separate aspects of the public education system to pass muster under the single-subject rule. In their complaint, Appellants supported this claim by extensive reference to the legislative history of the items contained in the Bill. They point out that, when introduced as separate items, some had failed on a floor vote, some passed in one chamber but were held in committee in the other, and some were never submitted for even committee consideration as individual items. They further assert that popular bills were "used as hostages to extort or compel enactment of the less popular bills."
¶ 40 Almost a century ago, this court opined that while the single-subject rule
Salt Lake City v. Wilson, 46 Utah. 60, 148 P. 1104, 1109 (1915). See also McGuire v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 603 P.2d 786, 789 (Utah 1979) (citing similar language from State ex rel. Edler v. Edwards, 34 Utah. 13, 95 P. 367, 368 (1908) as controlling authority). Furthermore, while bills must address a single subject, "`[t]here is no constitutional restriction as to the scope or magnitude of the single subject of a legislative act.'" Martineau v. Crabbe, 46 Utah. 327, 150 P. 301, 304 (1915) (emphasis added) (quoting the North Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of their constitution's single-subject rule in State v. Morgan, 2 S.D. 32, 48 N.W. 314, 317 (891)). "A liberal view should be taken of both the act and the constitutional provisions so as not to hamper the law making power, but to permit the adoption of comprehensive measures covering a whole subject." Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 Utah.2d 67, 305 P.2d 870, 873 (1957)(discussing both the single-subject and clear-title rules).
¶ 41 Other state courts have given a similar "liberal[] constru[ction]" to their constitutions' single-subject rules.
¶ 42 Examined on its face,
¶ 43 It is easy to imagine a law that all would agree violates the single-subject rule. For instance, a bill dealing with pet licenses, mining regulation and beekeeping could not be plausibly argued to fit under any all-encompassing rubric less general than "legislation," or at the most specific "safety" (assuming that the pet licensing regime had that as its purpose).
¶ 44 In addition to their general argument that the Bill contains too many disparate subjects, Appellants argue that it violates the single-subject rule for two specific reasons. First, they argue that it combines substantive law and appropriations measures,
¶ 45 Appellants urge us to adopt what they represent as the rule of Washington State Legislature v. State, 139 Wn.2d 129, 985 P.2d 353 (1999): a bright-line test holding that the combination in one bill of substantive and appropriations measures violates the single-subject rule. While conceding that we have never before set such a test, Appellants argue that dicta in four of our previous opinions suggest such a result. But it is not clear to us that Washington State Legislature establishes any such bright-line test. Because the provision at issue was an item "in an omnibus appropriations or operating budget bill" that "restrict[ed] access to public assistance eligibility," the court held that it violated the single-subject rule and struck it on that basis. Id. at 355, 363. The Bill before us neither "defines rights or eligibility for services" in the sense of the provision scrutinized in Washington State Legislature, nor is it included in a general "operating budget bill."
¶ 46 We are similarly unpersuaded by Appellants' argument that we have already endorsed such a bright-line standard. For instance, Appellants cite Carter v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah. 96, 96 P.2d 727, 733-34 (1939). There, we held that a specific part of a "plan of graduating [motor vehicle registration] fees according to the propensity of the vehicle to injure the highways" based upon "the fuel used in the engine of the vehicles" violated the single-subject rule. Id. at 733. Our explanation for this holding was that "[w]e have here an obvious departure from any thought of wear and tear upon the road"; the type of fuel used by a vehicle "bears no relationship to the object of the legislation." Id. In other words, Carter ruled that a provision that bore "no relationship" to a bill's larger purpose violated the single-subject rule — not, as Appellants frame it, because it was a revenue measure, but because it was incongruous with the rest of the bill.
¶ 47 Among Appellants' other citations is one to Petty v. Utah State Board of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1979). There we said "it is important to have in mind that the purpose of the Appropriations Act is to allocate finances, and not to affect substantive changes in the law on other matters." Id. at 1301. But the very next sentence reads: "Consequently, it is our opinion that such an expression of intent in an appropriations act should not be regarded as repealing or superseding other existing statutory law." Id. In Petty, the plaintiff was a student arguing that a statement of "the intent of the Legislature" as to the appropriate level of tuition for medical students prevented the Board of Regents
¶ 48 We are unpersuaded by these cases, and by the other cases cited by Appellants in their urging us to establish a rule that the combination of substantive and appropriations measures always violates the single-subject rule. We therefore decline to adopt such a rule. As explained above, the Bill on its face treats a single, albeit broad, subject: education. The presence in the Bill of funding measures directed towards education programs does not render it unconstitutional. We are left, then, with Appellants' remaining argument on this point: that the legislative history of the items in the Bill reveal that it is the product of impermissible "log-rolling," and that it therefore violates the single-subject rule.
For three reasons, however, we conclude that these facts — even taken at face value, as we do when reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss — do not state a claim that the Bill violates the single-subject rule.
¶ 50 First, the text of Article VI, Section 22 speaks to the contents and title of the Bill itself; it makes no reference to legislative motive. We have determined that the Bill itself, in treating multiple programs related to education, handles a "single subject"; we further determine that an itemized list of those programs is a clear expression of the Bill's content, which is what the clear-title rule requires. It is true that in Wilson we identified the "purpose" of the single-subject rule as "preventing the combination of incongruous subjects neither of which could be passed when standing alone." 148 P. at 1109 (emphasis added). But in light of our tradition of liberally construing the single-subject rule, see id., we have already concluded that the subjects in the Bill are not incongruous in the constitutional sense. Therefore, even taking at face value Appellants' assertions that portions of the Bill "could [not] be passed when standing alone," Wilson neither requires nor empowers us to find them unconstitutional solely on that basis if we have not determined that they are "incongruous." While the prevention of "log-rolling" may be a purpose of the single-subject rule, the text of that rule requires us to focus on a bill's contents, rather than conducting a review of a law's "backstory" as revealed in legislative history.
¶ 51 Second, Appellants have not identified — and we have not independently found — any prior opinion of this court that analyzes a single-subject claim by reference to the legislative history of the bill at issue. Appellants cite McGuire, 603 P.2d 786, and Jensen v. Matheson, 583 P.2d 77 (Utah 1978), for the proposition that this court has previously examined legislative journals in its Article VI, Section 22 jurisprudence. This is true, but those cases dealt with other provisions of the section: respectively, the clear-title rule and a voting/recordation provision.
¶ 52 Finally, where a bill has not been shown to violate the single-subject rule, separation-of-powers considerations make us hesitate to inquire into the internal process that led to the bill's passage. Sometimes we are required to, as it were, "pierce the veil" of the legislative text — for instance, when a facially neutral bill is alleged to have some impermissible invidious motive. And allegations of outright illegality, in the form of bribery or the like, have their remedy elsewhere in the law. But the line between forbidden "log-rolling" and mere "horse-trading" may be a fine one, and we are not confident in our ability — or even our constitutional power — to police it in the manner which Appellants ask of us.
¶ 53 The Bill was entitled "MINIMUM SCHOOL PROGRAM BUDGET AMENDMENTS." Under this title came a caption identifying the session in which the Bill was submitted and its chief sponsor and sponsor in the House. Under this caption came a double line, then the following: "LONG TITLE[.] General Description: This bill provides funding for the Minimum School Program and other education programs. Highlighted Provisions: This bill: [followed by a bullet-pointed list of short descriptions of the various components of the bill]."
¶ 54 This court considered the clear-title rule in Utah's first year of statehood. Ritchie v. Richards, 14 Utah. 345, 47 P. 670 (1896). There, we held that a bill entitled "An act relating to and making sundry provisions concerning elections," id. at 671 (emphasis added), could not constitutionally contain a provision governing the appointment of persons to vacated positions. Id. at 674. "This section," we determined, "does not relate to elections, nor does it concern elections. Therefore the title does not embrace it." Id.
¶ 55 A justice of a later generation enunciated general principles that guide our application of the clear-title rule:
Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah. 108, 197 P.2d 477, 508 (1948) (Latimer, J., concurring). A more recent opinion saw the purpose of the clear-title rule as ensuring that "the legislators will be advised of the subject and purpose of the act in order that there be no misunderstanding, omitting, nor burying or obscuring of what is being proposed." Jensen, 583 P.2d at 80.
¶ 56 Here, the bill's "long title" informs the reader that "[t]his bill provides funding for the Minimum School Program and other education programs," proceeding to give a full list of those programs in bullet-point format. This is constitutionally sufficient — if the "long title" can be considered part of the "title" which the constitution says must "clearly express[]" the bill's "subject." UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 22.
¶ 57 Appellants insist it cannot be so considered First, they observe that Article VI, Section 22 speaks of the bill's "title" in the singular. Second, they argue that our case law has treated additional or supplementary titles of laws as unnecessary surplusage. Third, they argue that the clear-title rule is intended to benefit the public and that the public is less likely than the legislators to notice the presence of such additional titles.
¶ 59 First, the fact that Article VI, Section 22 speaks of a bill's "title" in the singular is not dispositive. The Bill before us has a singular title. That title, it is true, is divided into a five-word header ("MINIMUM SCHOOL PROGRAM BUDGET AMENDMENTS") and a longer title, which is in turn divided into a "General Description" and a list of "Highlighted Provisions." But the text of Section 22 does not indicate how long or detailed a bill's "title" must be, or whether it may be divided into sub-parts. As we have interpreted and applied it above, the single-subject rule permits one Bill to treat multiple aspects of the public education system. Accordingly, a title such as the one this Bill has is arguably the fairest way of putting legislators and citizens on notice of what the Bill contains.
¶ 60 Second, Appellants cite Edwards, 95 P. at 369, in support of their argument that "the use of a second title may be constitutionally improper." The case is inapposite. In Edwards, we determined that certain "extraneous matter added to what constitutes the actual title is harmless. ... [and] wholly unnecessary, and the elimination of this surplus matter is ... required of us in order to preserve" an otherwise constitutional law. Id. (emphasis added). But here we have, if anything, the opposite situation. By itself, "MINIMUM SCHOOL PROGRAM BUDGET AMENDMENTS" might well be unconstitutionally under-inclusive. The "long title," with its list of programs contained in the Bill, removes the cloud over the Bill's constitutionality.
¶ 61 Third and finally, we disagree that the "long title" is of use only to legislators. It is not written in technical or misleading language. It puts anyone reading it, whether they be a member of the legislature or of the general public, on notice of the Bill's contents. For all these reasons, we determine that the full title of the Bill comports with the constitutional requirement that it "clearly express[]" the subject of the Bill. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 22.
¶ 62 We determine that Appellants do not have standing to bring any of their claims under the traditional doctrine of standing. We further determine that they lack standing to bring the Article X Claims even under the alternative doctrine of public-interest standing. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand with respect to those claims, directing the court on remand to dismiss them for lack of standing. We further determine that Appellants do have standing to bring the Article VI Claims under the doctrine of public-interest standing. Since their complaint fails to state a claim for violation of either the single-subject or clear-title rules, however, we affirm the district court's dismissal with respect to those claims.
Justice DURHAM authored the majority opinion in which Associate Chief Justice NEHRING and Justice PARRISH joined.
[The following is a representation of the entire introductory portion of the Bill, containing both its short title and its long title]
This bill provides funding for the Minimum School Program and other education programs.
This bill:
This bill provides an effective date.
Justice LEE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶ 63 In the past several decades, this court's standing jurisprudence has strayed
¶ 64 I respectfully dissent from the majority's invocation — and extension — of this "public interest" exception to the traditional requirement of standing. Its methodology is incompatible with the judicial power clause in Article VIII of the Utah Constitution. That clause limits our authority to the resolution of cases that fall within the traditional conception of the judicial power. In overriding these constraints, the majority robs the constitutional limits on our power of meaningful content. It does so to uphold standing for the Article VI claimants in this case on public interest grounds, thereby subjecting the standing inquiry to the arbitrary discretion of the court, under a standardless "test" that is little more than a post-hoc justification for a preferred result. Under this test, the standing question is left to a subjective, case-by-case assessment of a majority of the court as to whether the claims seem sufficiently "important" to merit review.
¶ 65 Instead of expanding the public interest exception, I would repudiate our prior dicta on this point and reject the exception altogether. And I would resolve the case under a traditional formulation of standing — one requiring an assertion of injury sustaining a private action. That formulation, in my view, requires dismissal of all of the claims at issue in this case, including the Article VI claims the majority reaches on public interest grounds.
¶ 66 Standing is not a judge-made principle of judicial restraint subject to common-law evolution over time. It is an essential element of the constitutional provisions defining and limiting the judicial power. Such an element requires careful definition, rooted in an interpretation of the binding text of our constitution. We assail the very principle of constitutionalism when we ignore that interpretive role and opt instead to invoke and refine standardless "exceptions" justifying (but failing to explain) our case-by-case preferences to exercise jurisdiction in some cases but not in others.
¶ 67 We recently underscored these central points in the parallel context of our mootness doctrine. In Utah Transit Authority v. Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, 289 P.3d 582, we repudiated a freestanding,
Id. ¶ 25 (citation omitted).
¶ 68 Our Utah Transit Authority opinion also clarified the appropriate methodology for interpreting the constitutional limits on our judicial power. While recognizing that the text of Article VIII's articulation of "[t]he judicial power of the state" does not "reveal the precise scope" of our power, we emphasized "one fundamental point": "The scope of our authority is not a matter for the courts to define at our preference or whim; we are constitutionally limited to wield only `judicial power' and may not act extra-judicially (regardless of how interesting or important the matter presented for our consideration)." Id. ¶ 20 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Mut. Ins., 2012 UT 24, ¶ 14, 282 P.3d 981 ("The limits on our jurisdiction are legal rules that define the nature and extent of the judicial power, not mere guidelines to be invoked or discarded at our whim."). And to give content to the text of the constitution, we turned to the traditional understanding of the judicial power, identifying long-established case law and constitutional history that informed the mootness doctrine's limitations on the judicial power.
¶ 69 As set forth in detail below, an inquiry in this case following the model set out in Utah Transit Authority reveals that standing, like mootness, places well-defined, principled limitations on the scope of Article VIII's grant of judicial power.
¶ 70 Thus, I cannot accept the "public interest" test invoked by the court. I would instead interpret Article VIII of our constitution to confine the authority of the Utah courts to hear cases filed by private plaintiffs only where they vindicate "private rights," as that term was historically understood at the time of the framing of the Utah Constitution. That standard requires dismissal of all claims in this case for lack of standing.
¶ 71 In the sections that follow, I set forth the historical basis for the standard I would adopt, show that this standard is compatible with most all of the holdings (but not some of the dicta) from our court on the law of standing, and explain why the citizen-plaintiffs in this case lack standing.
¶ 72 Under the framework employed in Utah Transit Authority, we must take seriously our role of interpreting the judicial power clause of Article VIII. And in interpreting that clause, we must examine the traditional understanding of the judicial power, identifying limits on the judicial power in established case law and in our constitutional history. If the traditional standing requirement is rooted in the constitution, it cannot be seen as a mere salutary invention of this court or as a matter within our power to "relieve" a plaintiff of fulfilling. See supra ¶ 13.
¶ 73 The starting point for this analysis, of course, is the text of Article VIII. That provision confers on our courts the "judicial power," and it speaks of our authority to issue "writs" and to decide "cases." UTAH CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 3, 5. These are definite terms with fixed content that place meaningful restrictions on the exercise of judicial power. First, because the power we wield must be "judicial," we are foreclosed from making law or announcing our views in an advisory or other non-judicial posture. See, e.g., Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶ 23, 289 P.3d 582.
¶ 74 Our interpretation of Article VIII, then, must be informed by an analysis of the traditional nature of the judicial power and of the types of writs and cases traditionally resolved in the courts. And in my view, the relevant history is clear. Established case law in Utah and elsewhere has long limited the judicial power to the resolution of suits brought by private parties in cases involving so-called "private rights."
¶ 75 Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century precedent established important limitations on the sorts of writs and cases that could be initiated by private parties and entertained by courts. The traditional formulation in the case law uniformly held that suits involving "public rights" — interests held by the public generally and not by individuals — could not be initiated by private plaintiffs.
¶ 76 Since before the founding of the Utah Constitution, it has been widely "understood [that] the tort action [is] under private control and the criminal action [is] under public control." Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102
¶ 77 Early Utah criminal law followed this pattern and confirms that actions by individuals to prosecute public wrongs are not within the judicial power. Utah courts carefully differentiated between the individual-specific harm typical to civil cases and the society-level harm involved in criminal matters. See Snow v. Snow, 13 Utah. 15, 43 P. 620, 622 (1896) (though a private party may benefit from a criminal contempt charge, it is imposed "to vindicate the authority and dignity of the people, as represented in and by their judicial tribunals"). Criminal process was appropriate for the latter, but not for the former. As one early opinion put it, "[criminal] punishment is not meted out as a `balm to hurt mind.' Nor is there in the law aught of malice against him who is punished. The power is exercised by the court as the representative, in this respect, of the people, — the ultimate sovereigns, — and in their interest and for their good." In re Whitmore, 9 Utah. 441, 35 P. 524, 528-29 (Utah Terr.1894) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, territorial criminal statutes required "the prosecuting attorney, or other counsel for the people, [to] open the cause, and offer the evidence in support of the indictment." Territory v. Catton, 5 Utah. 451, 16 P. 902, 908 (Utah Terr.1888) (quoting CRIM. CODE LAWS UTAH § 257(2), (5), (6) (1878)), rev'd on other grounds by Calton v. Utah, 130 U.S. 83, 9 S.Ct. 435, 32 L.Ed. 870 (1889). Though courts allowed private counsel to aid public prosecutors during trial, People v. Tidwell, 4 Utah. 506, 12 P. 61, 64 (Utah Terr.1886), I can find no instance of a private party indicting or trying a criminal suspect independent of state involvement. This is just the first of several indications that in the era of the founding of the Utah Constitution, the judicial power was understood to restrict the vindication of public rights to public officials — and to do so on the basis of a concern about the capacity of private litigants to account for the public weal and without regard to the importance of the issue involved.
¶ 78 This limitation was not confined to criminal prosecutions, however. Under the law of "public nuisance," for example, early American courts enforced the familiar principle that "[t]he public authorities alone can complain of nuisances, while they remain public or general." Seeley v. Bishop, 19 Conn. 128, 135 (1848).
¶ 79 Again, moreover, the proscription of private prosecution of public rights was justified
¶ 80 Though the public nuisance rule was subject to an exception, the exception itself only confirmed the public-/private-rights distinction. It held that a public nuisance action could be maintained where the nuisance resulted in "special damage" to the plaintiff — "an injury different in kind from that of which the public complains."
William B. Hale, Parties to Actions, in 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE 456, 472-73 (William M. McKinney ed., N.Y., Edward Thompson Co. 1899) (footnote omitted).
¶ 81 Utah's early nuisance law is identical, in that it held that "private individuals ... [could] not champion purely public rights." Lewis v. Pingree Nat'l Bank, 47 Utah. 35, 151 P. 558, 561 (1915). Our early cases indicate that "[n]o doubt the rule is well established that private persons may not invoke the aid of the courts to abate public nuisances, unless they can show that they suffer some special or peculiar injury or damage which is not common to the rest of the community." Id.; Startup v. Harmon, 59 Utah. 329, 203 P. 637, 640 (1921) (same). Not only was the plaintiff required to show special injury, but that injury was also required to be "different not merely in degree but in kind from that suffered by the public at large." Muir v. Kay, 66 Utah. 550, 244 P. 901, 905 (1925) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a different rule obtained, "a discharge in one case would be no bar to another, and thus there would be no end to litigation." Id. This precedent thus illustrates that, at and near the founding of the Utah Constitution, suits brought by private individuals to redress public wrongs were not the kind of "cases" subject to the judicial power.
¶ 82 Early mandamus actions in other jurisdictions conform with this understanding. The general rule was consistent with the practice of reserving "public" claims for public officials and allowing private suits only for special, individualized injuries. Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw articulated this principle as "[u]ndoubtedly" the law in Massachusetts: "[A] private individual can apply for a writ of mandamus only in a case where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be pursued or protected by the aid of this process, independent of that which he holds in common with the public at large; and it is for the public officers exclusively to apply, where public rights are to be subserved." In re
¶ 83 Utah's judicial ancestry is in line with the approach prescribed by Chief Justice Shaw and squarely supports the limitation on our power overridden by the majority today. Specifically, Utah's early mandamus cases required plaintiffs to show that they had "some peculiar interest separate and distinct from that of the community in general." Startup, 203 P. at 640. Only then could the plaintiff satisfy Utah statutory law allowing mandamus to issue for "part[ies] beneficially interested." See Crockett v. Bd. of Educ., 58 Utah. 303, 199 P. 158, 159-61 (1921). In Crockett, this court noted that "there are no fixed rules for determining" who is a beneficially interested party, but also confirmed that
Id. at 160. With this in mind, the court in Crockett granted a taxpayer's writ to compel a school board to publish statutorily required annual financial statements because the statute involved "was designed for the benefit and interests of the citizen taxpayers so that they [could] be informed as to whether or not the financial affairs of the school district each year have been properly and lawfully conducted on the part of the board of education." Id. at 159-60.
¶ 84 In Startup, by contrast, the court rejected the standing of a taxpayer who sought to command a county to satisfy a statutory duty to provide funds to support widowed mothers. 203 P. at 638. The court's opinion in Startup analyzed the standing of a mandamus petitioner in a manner consistent with public nuisance standing: "If the nuisance affects him only in the same manner and to the same extent that it affects the people of the community in general, it is an elementary rule of practice that he would have no standing as a plaintiff in such proceeding. If, however, he is peculiarly affected or injured by the nuisance, then, under all the authorities, he has the right to institute an action in his own name to abate the nuisance." Id. at 640.
¶ 85 Applying these principles, the Startup court dismissed the petitioner's claim for lack of standing because the petitioner was not part of the class protected or benefited by the statute (widowed mothers), but was instead a member of "the community in general" who "ha[d] no greater interest than any other resident." Id. at 640-41. Distinguishing Crockett, the court reiterated that the petitioner in that case had "come within the class of persons ... specially interested in the relief applied for" — residents of a particular school district. Id. at 641. At the same time, the court doubted that standing would have been found in Crockett had the taxpayer not been such a resident. Id. In such case, the Crockett taxpayer would have been similar to the Startup petitioner — no more than "interested as a citizen in seeing that the law was enforced." See id.
¶ 86 Seeing "no reason" in law to sustain standing by a citizen merely interested in assuring the enforcement of the law, the court rejected the Startup petitioner's standing. Id. In so doing, the court noted that "[a]ny widowed mother of the class mentioned, for whose relief the law was enacted, would undoubtedly have the right to apply for a writ of mandate to compel an enforcement of the law," and that "[a]ny attorney authorized to represent the county ... would have the right ... to institute [a] proceeding." Id. But a "person whose relation to the case" is merely that of a citizen seeking enforcement of the law could not be sustained without "set[ting] at naught" the rules of standing in mandamus.
¶ 87 This historical practice of differentiating between public and private rights is fundamental. The above-cited cases distinguishing private and public rights represent not just a traditional policy preference for public control over public actions, but a principle long understood to define and establish limits on the judicial power.
¶ 88 Prohibiting private parties from vindicating grievances shared by the general community plays an important role in maintaining the separation of powers.
¶ 89 When we exceed our constitutional authority, we necessarily tread on ground that belongs to a coordinate branch of government. As we noted in Jenkins v. Swan, "[t]he requirement that a plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome of a dispute is intended to confine the courts to a role consistent with the separation of powers, and to limit the jurisdiction of the courts to those disputes which are most efficiently and effectively resolved through the judicial process." 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983). And as we explained in Baird v. State, "[t]o grant standing to a litigant, who cannot distinguish himself from all citizens, would be a significant inroad on the representative form of government, and cast the courts in the role of supervising the coordinate branches of government." 574 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah 1978).
¶ 90 When a dispute implicates commonly held public rights, the prerogative to advocate that interest belongs to the body politic generally, not to private individuals. And the advocacy of such public rights belongs either to government representatives suing for the public in court, or to the representative branches of government. As we put it in Jenkins v. Swan, "the airing of generalized grievances and the vindication of public rights are properly addressed to the legislature, a forum where freewheeling debate on broad issues of public policy is in order." 675 P.2d at 1149-50.
¶ 91 We cannot simultaneously honor these fundamental restraints on our power while defining that power through ad hoc, discretionary standards rooted in our sense of the
¶ 92 We should repudiate the public interest approach and reiterate and clarify the traditional formulation of the doctrine of standing. We should decide this case in accordance with that traditional formulation.
¶ 93 Our modern standing cases do not foreclose the approach I advocate; they leave plenty of room for faithful adherence to the traditional standing formulation. Prior to today's decision, our cases have only occasionally adverted to a "public interest" notion of standing, and almost always in dicta (as an alternative to traditional standing). Today the court crosses a significant, problematic line. It extends the dicta in our cases to a square holding, and does so in a manner that deprives the limits of the public interest exception of any meaningful content.
¶ 94 The holdings in most of our cases (if not always the dicta) have effectively maintained traditional limitations on standing. In Jenkins v. Swan, for example, we foreclosed standing in cases where "other potential plaintiffs with a more direct interest in [the] particular question" exist. 675 P.2d 1145, 1151 (Utah 1983). This holding appropriately prefers parties that meet traditional standing requirements. See id. at 1150 ("[T]his Court will not readily relieve a plaintiff of the... requirement of showing a real and personal interest in the dispute."); York v. Unqualified Wash. Cnty. Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679, 680 (Utah 1986) (per curiam).
¶ 95 We departed from that approach to some extent in Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74, 148 P.3d 960, where we outlined the parameters of an expanded "public right" standing. But that discussion was dicta and not controlling. Because the plaintiff satisfied traditional standing requirements, the court did not need to opine about an alternative (public right) standing test. See id. ¶ 32.
¶ 96 To my knowledge, we have only once employed the Sierra Club dicta in a case where we found traditional standing lacking: in City of Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency of Tooele City, 2010 UT 38, ¶ 16, 233 P.3d 461. In that case, we upheld a municipality's "alternative" standing to litigate a contract matter involving a claim for breach of a development agreement. Id. Yet although the City of Grantsville opinion upholds Grantsville City's standing on public interest grounds, id., that conclusion was again unnecessary. The city, after all, was a signatory to the agreement with an express right to receive proceeds of the development, and as such it was unquestionably a third-party
¶ 97 In City of Grantsville the court claimed not to reach the third-party beneficiary basis for standing. See id. ¶ 14 & n.2 (acknowledging that third-party beneficiaries have traditional standing to sue under a contract, but concluding not to "address this issue" because Grantsville City "does not argue it"). But in my view the court necessarily (if implicitly) relied on this ground, as Grantsville City's third-party beneficiary status is the only plausible legal basis for its standing.
¶ 98 For one thing, the City's failure to cite a third-party beneficiary basis for its standing could not have been dispositive. Standing is jurisdictional and is thus a matter the court has an obligation to consider sua sponte. Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶ 26 & n.17, 289 P.3d 582. And once we determine to reach an issue, we can hardly be required to blind ourselves from considering authority of relevance to its resolution.
¶ 99 And in my view the court must have relied on that status in its decision. A complete stranger to a contract would never be granted standing to sue to enforce it. See Hooban v. Unicity Int'l, Inc., 2012 UT 40, ¶ 24, 285 P.3d 766 ("[Plaintiff] was deemed a stranger to the contract, and as such he had no rights to enforce it or obligations under it."). And the enforcement of a mere contract is not a matter of fundamental public importance; surely it is less so than the constitutional claims under Article X deemed insufficient by the majority today. See supra ¶ 35. So even the City of Grantsville opinion is not really authority for public interest standing generally (and certainly not public interest standing in contract actions brought by third parties); it is better viewed as endorsing the standing of a named third-party beneficiary who failed to press a third-party beneficiary argument.
¶ 100 This case is thus a significant milestone. It marks the first time the court has endorsed a general theory of public interest standing in a square holding. That holding is problematic on many levels. In addition to ignoring the traditional limits on our authority under Article VIII, the public interest exception undermines at least two strands of our case law requiring a real party in interest to bring its own claims.
¶ 101 First, rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." Standing overlaps with the real party in interest requirement "inasmuch as both terms are used to designate a plaintiff who possesses a sufficient interest in the action to be entitled to be heard on the merits." 6A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1542 (3d ed. 2012). Courts generally define a real party in interest as "the person who is the true owner of the right sought to be enforced." See Pillsbury Co. v. Wells Dairy, Inc., 752 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Iowa 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). So, even if a merely "competent" or "appropriate" party could establish standing under the proposed "public interest" principle, it would have to satisfy other rules governing parties in dispute, including the requirement that it be the
¶ 102 Second, we have traditionally limited a litigant's ability to assert a third party's rights. See Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786, 789 (Utah 1992). Third-party vindication of another's rights is generally proper only if "some substantial relationship between the claimant and the third parties [exists]," if it is impossible for the rightholders to assert their own constitutional rights, and if the third parties' constitutional rights would be diluted "were the assertion of jus tertii not permitted." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
¶ 103 We have recognized these limitations for good reason. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, "`courts should not adjudicate [a third party's] rights unnecessarily," as "it may be that in fact the holders of those rights ... do not wish to assert them'" and the "third parties themselves usually will be the best proponents of their own rights." Wilderness Soc. v. Kane Cnty., 632 F.3d 1162, 1171-72 (10th Cir.2011) (second alteration in original) (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976)).
¶ 104 I dissent because I see no basis in our precedent or elsewhere for abandoning these principles. I find no comfort in the fact that the approach embraced by the majority today "is not unusual in state jurisprudence." Supra ¶ 16. That is apparently true. But it is also beside the point if the trends in caselaw outside of Utah are incompatible with the provisions of the law that we are bound to enforce. And that is exactly how I see the authority before us.
¶ 105 The state precedent cited by the majority rests entirely on the faulty premise of "standing" as a judge-made principle of prudential restraint. In adopting a public interest conception of standing, these state courts have routinely ignored the governing constitutional language — with the dismissive assertion that the federal "case or controversy" limitation is not a part of the state judicial power clause. See supra ¶ 16 (noting that the cited opinions are "mindful that their constitutions do not impose the same restrictions on their judicial power that the federal constitution imposes on federal courts"). For reasons I've explained above, the conclusion (of unbridled, common-law power) does not at all follow from the premise (the lack of a "case or controversy" clause). Thus, the court may find persuasive the notion of standing in state court as "`a self-imposed rule of restraint'" or a "`judge-made doctrine'" that "`free[s]'" state courts to "`reject procedural frustrations in favor of'" their own subjective sense of what is a "`just and expeditious.'" Supra ¶ 16 n.10 (quoting 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties § 30 (2012)). But I find them helpful only in highlighting the problematic foundation of the public interest doctrine of standing. We should reject that doctrine and instead follow the traditional formulation of standing that is deeply rooted in the holdings of our cases and in the text of Article VIII.
¶ 106 In upholding plaintiffs' standing to assert their Article VI claims in this case, the court not only invokes the "public interest" exception in a square holding; it stretches the exception in a manner that erases all meaningful limits on the doctrine of standing. The majority heralds its intent to preserve "strict standards" in a manner that "avoid[s] the temptation to apply a judge's own beliefs and philosophies to a determination of what questions are of great public importance."
¶ 107 First, in repudiating any requirement that the plaintiff be a traditional claimant with an individual injury — or even the "most appropriate party," as our prior dicta sometimes suggested
¶ 108 That becomes clear when the court actually applies the test. In deeming plaintiffs "appropriate," the court says nothing that couldn't be said about any litigant with the resources to hire effective counsel (and with even the most remote interest). Perhaps it's true that plaintiffs have "done an admirable job of briefing the facts and controlling law" in this case, supra ¶ 29, but that is no meaningful gateway to standing. Nor is the fact that the plaintiffs have "policy concerns" and are "focus[ed] on the instant constitutional challenge." Supra ¶ 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). We should require (and almost always have required) more from litigants than a showing that they are deeply worried about the case before us. Finally, the fact that plaintiffs "have caused this court to consider" the Article VI issues they have raised and to "clarify the standards they impose for the first time in decades" may ultimately be an "achievement." Supra ¶ 29.
¶ 109 The court cements the circularity of its test in its articulation of the second step of the analysis. While acknowledging the existence of plaintiffs with concrete interests in suing to challenge S.B. 2 (such as teachers who fail to qualify for a salary supplement under the statute or textbook publishers whose books are not approved by the statutory approval program), the court dismisses these "hypothetical" plaintiffs as irrelevant — asserting that their failure to file suit to date is enough to render "unlikely" a lawsuit by these parties. Supra ¶ 30. This is a striking — and deeply troubling — step in our public interest standing jurisprudence. Before today, the question was not whether directly affected parties had filed suit, but whether they existed. See Haymond v. Bonneville
¶ 110 Finally, the court's test is also circular in its assessment of the ultimate question of whether the Article VI claims asserted by plaintiffs are "of sufficient importance and general interest that claims of their violation may be brought even by plaintiffs who lack standing under the traditional criteria." Supra ¶ 27. Except to conclude that the Article VI issues are "part of the fundamental structure of legislative power articulated in our constitution," supra ¶ 27, the court offers no justification for deeming this element satisfied. And the court's further explication of the point only confirms its analytical emptiness. I see no rational, articulable basis for deeming the Article VI issues sufficiently important while rejecting the Article X issues on this score.
¶ 111 It is hardly an answer to note that "[n]ot every constitutional provision" is sufficiently important. Supra ¶ 27. That only begs the question of which ones clear the bar — and of the theoretical basis for setting the bar, or the level at which it is set. In begging these questions, the court has evaluated the importance element entirely within the confines of a black box. That not only deprives the parties in this case of an understanding of the basis of the court's decision; it also withholds from lower courts the tools needed to make these determinations going forward.
¶ 112 The hollow nature of the majority's standing analysis is confirmed by the court's ultimate rejection of public interest standing for the Article X claims. The court's proffered rationale — that the Article VI claims involve "restrictions which must be observed every time the legislature exercises its core function of passing laws" while the Article X claims involve a mere "a delegation of a defined subject to particular agency," supra ¶ 36, — is misdirection at best. Surely abiding by the constitution's power-allocation scheme is part of the legislature's "core function" that must be considered each time a law is passed. And the majority's refusal to "conclude that such questions can never be appropriate ones in which to employ the public-interest standing doctrine" only bears that out and emphasizes the standardless quality of this doctrine. Supra ¶ 36. Either the violation of a constitutional provision is important or it is not. Its importance cannot depend on the identity of the plaintiffs or the circumstances of each case, as the majority implies. Supra ¶ 36.
¶ 113 In all, the majority's distinction between the Article VI and Article X claims does not spring from meaningful analysis. It is an attempt to paper over an ultimate conclusion
¶ 114 The exercise of unfettered discretion is troubling, especially on a matter constituting a limit on our power under the Utah Constitution. As we explained in Utah Transit Authority, "on matters affecting the scope of our own power or jurisdiction, our duty to vigilantly follow the strictures of the constitution is a matter of great significance." 2012 UT 75, ¶ 26, 289 P.3d 582. We ignore that responsibility when we treat the constitutional limits on our power as "mere matter[s] of convenience or judicial discretion." Id. ¶ 27. And we undermine the fundamental notion of a written constitution when we adopt jurisdictional standards that show no fidelity to that document and seize unbridled "discretion to decide which cases should be spun out and which cut off based on some vague sense of fairness or importance of the issue." Id.
¶ 115 The public interest notion of standing cannot stand in the face of these principles. The court's extension of this doctrine here is particularly problematic, as it cements the public interest exception in a square holding, and in a manner that assures arbitrariness in its application going forward.
¶ 116 For all these reasons, we should reinforce the constitutional basis for our traditional conception of standing and repudiate the public interest exception as incompatible with our constitutional tradition. And we should vacate and dismiss this case for lack of standing.
¶ 117 The Article VI claims at issue here are prototypical, generalized grievances. Plaintiffs have asserted no injury peculiar to them — no interest or stake beyond that of all Utah citizens. They are complaining about the process that resulted in the enactment of S.B. 2 — a process allegedly lacking the clear title and single subject required by the Utah Constitution — and not an unlawful impact of the legislation on them as private individuals.
¶ 118 Thus, plaintiffs are not individuals or entities with a direct stake in challenging S.B. 2, like the affected teachers or book publishers identified by the majority. Supra ¶ 30. They are Utah taxpayers asserting a generalized challenge to the propriety of the legislative process culminating in S.B. 2. Their standing cannot be upheld under our historical standing caselaw without doing serious violence to their core principle. See supra ¶¶ 72-92. They lack standing on that basis, and their case should be dismissed.
¶ 120 This is not the sort of case where the plaintiffs before the court are the only kinds of parties who could conceivably litigate this kind of action. Clearly there are plaintiffs out there with a direct interest in these suits — textbook publishers, science teachers, and the State Board of Education, for example. Those plaintiffs have elected not to sue. That seems significant. We should not broaden the field of proper plaintiffs just because we wish that the directly interested parties had filed suit, or because we think the issues at stake seem important or interesting. The judicial power is confined to the resolution of disputes between the parties who have a direct stake in the outcome. The plaintiffs who filed these cases do not qualify under that rubric.
¶ 121 The bounds of our judicial power cannot accommodate the kind of expansion that "public right" standing for merely "competent" plaintiffs involves. We cannot properly allow less than directly interested parties to litigate before us. To do so risks unrestrained decision-making based on underdeveloped facts and law and ultimately against the will and rights of those directly harmed.
The dissent correctly observes that the judicial power of this court is limited by the principle of separation of powers. Infra ¶ 69. Indeed, that principle is enshrined in the state constitution. "The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments... and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others...." UTAH CONST. art. V, § 1 (emphasis added). In entertaining a claim that the Legislature has violated the constitutional restraints on its lawmaking procedures, we are not "exercis[ing] a function" of either of the other branches of government. As the dissent notes, infra ¶ 69 n.3, see also infra ¶ 89, separation-of-powers concerns support the traditional standing doctrine requiring individualized injury. But in the absence of a textual requirement of "case or controversy" akin to those of the federal Article III, these concerns do not reflect an absolute, constitutionally-imposed jurisdictional requirement, but rather a "historical and pragmatic conviction that particular disputes are most amenable to resolution in particular forums." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1149. The questions, for instance, of what level of funding is appropriate for public education, or how that funding should be distributed across the state, are — in the absence of constitutional or statutory claims — classic examples of "disputes most amenable to resolution in" non-judicial fora. The question of whether a law was passed in violation of Article VI, Section 22 is not such a dispute.
The dissent asserts that it is not urging the wholesale adoption of federal standing doctrine. Infra ¶ 69 n.4. Indeed, it suggests that federal standing doctrine has become too lax, implicitly arguing that our state standing doctrine is properly more restrictive than the federal practice under Article III of the United States Constitution. We are aware of no state court — even among those which have explicitly rejected an alternative, public — interest standing doctrine — which has taken such a position.
The dissent asserts that "the conclusion (of unbridled, common-law power) does not at all follow from the premise (the lack of a `case or controversy' clause)." Infra ¶ 105. First, we disagree with the characterization of our public-interest standing doctrine as "unbridled." Second, we note that the dissent does not suggest what does follow from our constitution's lack of a "case or controversy" requirement. Again, the dissent's only suggested difference between state and federal standing doctrine is that the latter has become too lax. See supra ¶ 12 n.4; infra ¶ 69. We disagree, and align with the courts of numerous other states in determining that the lack of a "case or controversy" requirement in our state constitution permits the development of alternative, public-interest standing doctrines.
As noted above, supra ¶ 12 n.4, the dissent's position goes well beyond that of states which reject alternative standing in its suggestion that our doctrine of standing should, if anything, be more restrictive than the federal one. See infra ¶ 69 n.4.
The dissent references a second case in tandem with Crockett. In Startup v. Harmon, 59 Utah. 329, 203 P. 637 (1921), this court held that a taxpayer lacked standing to seek a writ compelling a county to disburse funds to widowed mothers, even where such disbursement was statutorily required. Id. at 641. The instant case is, in our view, much closer to Crockett than to Startup. Indeed, from a separation-of-powers perspective, see supra ¶ 12 n.4, if — as in Crockett — taxpayers have standing to compel the publication of statutorily required audits, recognition of standing is even more appropriate where parties request only that the courts consider whether a given law was passed in accordance with the constitution, since the determination of that question does not require this court to instruct another branch of government to do anything other than obey the constitutional limits on that other branch's power.
As the dissent observes, the standard we enunciate for the public-interest standing doctrine must be applied not only on appeal but at trial. Infra ¶ 108 n.26. In our discussion of the doctrine, and our differential treatment of the Article VI and Article X Claims (as well as Appellants' appropriateness with respect to both sets of claims), we have provided guidance for trial courts in future cases. But a universally applicable formulation is neither appropriate nor available in this area. Traditional standing requirements have themselves been the subject of much discussion and refinement in this and other courts; so too is such refinement proper with the alternative doctrine.
Some state courts appear to have set the bar for what constitutes a violation of the single-subject rule at the level of total incongruity. E.g., People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill.2d 80, 243 Ill.Dec. 233, 723 N.E.2d 265, 267 (1999) ("[A] legislative act violates the single subject rule when the General Assembly includes within one bill unrelated provisions that by no fair interpretation have any legitimate relation to one another." (internal quotation marks omitted)). We need not establish so liberal a test in order to conclude that the Bill in question today does not violate the single-subject rule.
That conclusion highlights the question for resolution here, which is whether a decision on a case falling outside the scope of our traditional doctrine of standing is an appropriate exercise of "judicial power." We should answer that question, as we did in Utah Transit Authority, with reference to the historical limits on the judicial power in our constitutional history. And if that history cuts against public interest standing, we should reject that doctrine as ultra vires under our constitution. For that same reason, the historical, established understanding of the judicial power is no mere "pragmatic conviction," but a constitutional requirement — one rooted in the notion of the "judicial power" that persists even "in the absence of a textual requirement of `case or controversy' akin to those of the federal Article III." Supra ¶ 12 n.4.
As explained in greater detail below, infra ¶¶ 117-18, the Article VI claimants in this case fall in the latter category. Their only interest is as citizens seeking enforcement of laws that protect all Utah citizens equally. If it is enough to sustain public interest standing to note that the law being vindicated is "designed for the public interest and benefit," nothing will be left of the key distinction in Crockett and Startup. The same can be said of any law, so the majority's argument must be rejected if we are to retain any semblance of a limit on the doctrine of standing.
On the other hand, this factor is also problematic at its core. Public interest or importance may often cut against the propriety of the exercise of judicial power. The matters of greatest societal interest — involving a grand, overarching balance of important public policies — are beyond the capacity of the courts to resolve. The majority acknowledges this concern, noting that "`the more generalized the issues, the more likely they ought to be resolved in the legislative or executive branches.'" Supra ¶ 31 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ¶ 39, 148 P.3d 960). But the court ultimately fails to give effect to this principle. The Article VI claims presented implicate issues that are among the most generalized one could imagine — involving structural restrictions on the legislative process, which affect all citizens in a general, undifferentiated manner.
Although these seem to be precisely the sort of generalized matters calling for deference to the legislative process, the court dismisses this concern on the ground that resolution of this case does not run afoul of political question doctrine. Supra ¶ 31. That is unpersuasive. The justiciability bar to resolution of political questions is analytically distinct from the limits of the doctrine of standing. The latter focuses on the nature of the claimant's interest; the former concerns itself with the nature of the legal standard implicated by that interest. Each is a separate hurdle, and clearing one hurdle (political question) does not erase the need to clear the other (standing).
